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Abstract
To promote pro-poor payments for environmental services, it is necessary to identify institutional options that reduce
transaction costs and organisational problems associated with establishing and maintaining contracts with small-scale
environmental service providers. This study examined the dual functionality of state forest enterprises (SFEs) in
the implementation of the Payments for Forest Environmental Services (PFES) Program in Vietnam. We considered
whether SFEs’ involvement in the programme could reduce transaction costs and organisational problems. Data were
collected from Tu Ly SFE in Hoa Binh province, northern Vietnam and from implementing agencies at various in-
stitutional levels. A survey of households participating in the SFE loan programme, and two stakeholder workshops
were executed in 2014. The results revealed that Tu Ly SFE plays an important role in the livelihood of many farmers.
A SWOT analysis exhibited SFEs’ advantage over other state agencies in implementing national forest management
programmes as there are fewer parties involved with greater autonomy and outreach in the district. This study pro-
poses the acknowledgment of SFEs as environmental service providers in their own forestlands and to use SFEs as
intermediaries in the Payments for Forest Environmental Services Programme activities.
Keywords: environmental services, intermediaries, services providers, transaction costs
1 Introduction
Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes
have been implemented in different forms to encourage
watershed protection, forest protection, erosion control,
climate regulation and biodiversity conservation world-
wide. PES focuses on bringing together service pro-
viders and users where providers are paid to maintain
or improve environmental outcomes. There is an in-
creasing interest in private investments, especially in
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developed countries such as the United States, Aus-
tralia and France, based on Coasean economics (Coase,
1960), where transaction costs are assumed to be low,
property rights are clearly defined, enforcement agen-
cies are well funded, and an external monitoring system
is credible (Clements et al., 2010). In developing coun-
tries, government-funded PES plays a major role (Eco-
system Marketplace, 2008; Scherr & Bennett, 2011; Qi,
2014). Unfortunately, these countries have often unclear
land ownership, weak law enforcement, and government
agencies have poor capacity and little political support.
With the inception of the Rewarding Upland Poor
for Environmental Services (RUPES) (CIFOR, 2013)
and the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
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Forest Degradation (REDD+) programmes (Zhu et al.,
2010), PES schemes are on the rise in developing coun-
tries, especially in Asia. Vietnam leads Southeast Asia
in PES with a programme supported by the govern-
ment under the decree issued in 2010 on the Payments
for Forest Environmental Services Program (hereafter,
PFES programme) (Government of Vietnam, 2010).
Households, individuals, village communities, and or-
ganisations working in protection forests, special-use
forests, and production forests (those that supply en-
vironmental services) are eligible for payments. While
environmental benefits can be generated from produc-
tion forests (Kile et al., 1998; Nambiar, 1999), in prac-
tice, PES programmes are often mixed with the Govern-
ment of Vietnam’s effort to promote plantation of fast-
growing tree species (e.g. Acacia mangium, A. auriculi-
formis) as came up from the Five Million Hectare Re-
forestation Program, known as Programme 661 (Gov-
ernment of Vietnam, 1998).
The PFES programme in Vietnam involves both high
transaction costs (Liss, 2008; Thuy et al., 2013) and
operational costs due to the centralised management
system (Phuc et al., 2012) and many contracts with
small-scale environmental service providers. Transac-
tion costs of institutions are the costs incurred when
targeting, negotiating, contracting, executing and im-
plementing forest management contracts, and for activ-
ities such as monitoring and coordinating tasks related
to the management and use of forest resources. Effect-
ive PFES implementation requires substantial coordin-
ation between several government agencies in Vietnam.
To promote sustainable PFES, it is necessary to identify
institutional options that reduce transaction costs and or-
ganisational problems.
To date, limited research is available regarding in-
novative ways in reducing transaction costs of PES pro-
grammes. Therefore, we examined the potential role of
the re-vamped SFEs in managing some aspects of Vi-
etnam’s PFES programme. We explored the dual func-
tionality of SFEs (1) as environmental service providers
in their own forest lands and (2) as intermediaries in
PFES programme activities outside their areas of ad-
ministration. As providers, they can offer environmental
services such as (1) watershed protection, (2) forest pro-
tection by off-setting pressure on primary or old growth
forests, (3) carbon sequestration, (4) water quality con-
trol, (5) degraded land rehabilitation, and (6) landscape
enhancement (Fuhrer, 2000; Shelton et al., 2001; Lamb
et. al., 2005; de Groot & van der Meer, 2010). Po-
tential goods from plantation forests are (1) sustainable
source of renewable energy and industrial raw materials,
(2) non-timber forest products (NTFPs), and (3) local
employment (Shelton et al., 2001). As intermediar-
ies, SFEs can serve as implementing agencies for con-
tracting, directing, monitoring and evaluating govern-
ment forest programmes. We reviewed existing policies,
while considering the feasibility of the proposed ar-
rangement, and acknowledging the perceptions of the
stakeholders. We accounted for the shortcomings of
SFEs without a lengthy repetition of the details which
can be found in the many reports on the processes of
forestry reforms (Nguyen et al., 2010). From a scholarly
perspective, we contributed to current research on trans-
action costs (e.g., Liss, 2008; Sikor & Tan, 2011; Som-
merville et al., 2011; Phuc et al., 2012), which largely
addressed implementation issues, particularly with re-
gard to individual farmer contracts. While this paper
focuses on the challenges it faces from the perspective
of transaction cost and the overall institutional set up for
PES programme implementation, it also acknowledges
the fact that plantations as a form of land use do not
always correspond with sustainable forest management,
especially in relation to heavy loss of biodiversity it may
cause (McElwee, 2009; Šálek & Sloup, 2012; Šálek &
Výlupek, 2012).
State Forest Enterprises in Vietnam
SFEs have played an important role in the forestry
sector in Vietnam. After the country’s independence
from French colonial rule, 6.3 million hectares of forest
were managed by SFEs from 1954 until 1986 (MARD,
2001 as cited by Sikor & Tan, 2011). SFEs were man-
dated to protect forests and manage silviculture. How-
ever, SFEs were criticised for ignoring their role in
forest protection and for prioritising optimisation of tim-
ber production to meet the increasing demand for forest
products (Sikor, 1998; de Jong et al., 2006; Tan et al.,
2008; Nguyen et al., 2014). In 1987, when the Doi Moi
economic reform was launched with the goal of creat-
ing a socialist-oriented market economy, the budget for
SFEs from the central government were gradually re-
duced with less centralised control of the forestry sector
(Artemiev, 2003). The reforms did not provide suffi-
cient incentives to develop sustainable and commercial
forestry (ibid.). Consequently, Vietnam faced a con-
tinuing decline in area under forest cover until the mid-
1990s (Nguyen et al., 2010).
Since 1991, forest management policies and practices
in Vietnam have substantially changed. A state-run sys-
tem has evolved into a new system that included house-
holds and communities as actors in forest and land man-
agement (1991 Law on Forest Protection and Develop-
F. Milan et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 118 - 2 (2017) 269–281 271
ment). Over the following years, numerous decrees, de-
cisions and guidelines were promulgated regarding the
reallocation of land and the devolution of land use rights
to private organisations and households (e.g., 1992 De-
cree No. 327-CT: National forest protection programme
327; 1994 Decree 02/CP: Allocation of forestry land to
organisations, households and individuals for stable and
long term use for forestry purposes; 1995 Decree No.
1-CP: Regulations on the allotment of land by State-
owned businesses for agricultural production, forestry
and aquaculture). SFEs’ authority was limited over nat-
ural forests, which contract farmers for the management
and protection (1993 Law on Land). In 1998, the gov-
ernment launched Programme 661 (Decision 661/QD-
TTg: Afforestation of five million hectares of forest).
SFEs participated in the programme under the category
of large forest owners. The programme provided a con-
tinuing source of government cash flow to SFEs that
own protection forest (EASRD, 2005). SFEs played
the role of implementing government agencies (inter-
mediaries) by contracting, directing, monitoring and
evaluating contract fulfilments with household benefi-
ciaries of forestland in their areas. At the same time,
SFEs were assigned responsibility for achieving the pro-
gramme’s objective of planting production forests in
their own land in two phases (1998–2000 and 2001–
2005), via preferential loans. In 2004, through De-
cree No. 200/2004/ND-CP: Rearrangement and innov-
ation of forest enterprises, SFEs became fully autono-
mous commercial enterprises, while SFEs managing the
more protected forests were transformed into Protection
Forest Management Boards (hereafter, PFMBs).
To date, SFEs manage 15 % of Vietnam’s natural
forest and 17 % of its production forest, a substan-
tial portion of the reported 13.36 million ha of forest
cover in the country (MARD, 2012). The policies al-
lowed SFEs to manage government projects, such as
Program 661, by entering into contracts with farmers
to plant and protect new forests or to plant production
forests.
2 Conceptual framework and methodology
2.1 Conceptual framework
From literature we considered four criteria essential
in ensuring long-term success of a PES program: (i) ac-
ceptability, (ii) impact, (iii) costs, and (iv) financial sus-
tainability of PES schemes (Fig. 1).
Acceptability – PES programs can be formulated to
account for the different motivations of service pro-
viders and service users. On the one hand, PES schemes
Fig. 1: Key criteria for a successful Payments for Forest Envir-
onmental Services Programme (PFES).
Source: Own depiction.
must generate revenue which is necessary for service
providers to ensure they implement and maintain sus-
tainable forest management or land use changes that
will, in turn, produce environmental services (Nguyen
et al., 2013). Acceptability of the terms and transac-
tion costs (monetary and non-monetary) of participat-
ing in PES schemes must be addressed (Falconer, 2000;
Mettepenningen et al., 2009). If incentives are not ac-
ceptable, potential service providers are likely to ignore
them in their private decision making, leading to envir-
onmentally sub-optimal land use decisions. Among oth-
ers, payments must account for the opportunity costs of
the service providers. Pricing and other income generat-
ing opportunities are important in the design of PES pro-
grams, especially when service providers must modify
their livelihood strategies or change their methods of
production. On the other hand, payments should be
within the capacity of the service users and set at a fair
level (Kronenberg & Hubacek, 2013). High transaction
costs can influence price setting (Vatn, 2010). The is-
sue of transaction costs concerns to how costly it is to
coordinate PES.
Impact – In developing countries, PES schemes
are often designed to achieve both environmental and
poverty reduction objectives (Tallis et al., 2008; Gauvin
et al., 2010; Dunn, 2011) but this can be challenging
(Zilberman et al., 2008). Some authors have tried to link
the benefits of PES to poor service providers (Bulte et
al., 2008; Wunder, 2008; Zilberman et al., 2008; Milder
et al., 2010). Poor farmers can benefit from PES (Pagi-
ola et al., 2005) if they can provide the services at low
cost and if the labour requirement is reasonable (Scherr
et al., 2006).
Costs – This criterion refers to the costs that gov-
ernment incurs due to the implementation of the PFES
programme. These costs may need partially or fully
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be financed by taxpayer’s money be it of a domestic
or foreign source. It is therefore important to review
whether a PFES programme is effective given its cost.
The targeting, negotiating, contracting, and monitoring
costs of PES schemes can be substantial in many con-
tracts with small-scale service providers (FAO, 2007;
Sommerville et al., 2011). Strategic use of intermediar-
ies can improve coordination, while reducing monitor-
ing and transaction costs (Dunn, 2011). Agencies (such
as SFEs) may have the capacity to reduce coordination
costs when there are interdependencies (Vatn, 2010).
Given the extensive geographic distribution of forests,
a variety of organisations and persons may be involved
in monitoring efforts. Consequently, the mandate given
to these agencies, their capacity (funding, skills and ex-
perience of personnel, organisational design), and the
way in which they interact (institutional structures and
arrangements) will determine the success of the system
(FAO, 2001).
Financial sustainability – Financial sustainability re-
quires that revenues are sufficient to cover the ongoing
costs of a PES programme (Mayrand & Paquin, 2004).
Revenues can come from taxes, user fees, state sub-
sidies, and grants from international organisations. If
PES users accrue large benefits, such as in the case of
hydropower operators benefitting from wise manage-
ment of land and water resources in upstream areas, they
will have an incentive to participate in a PES programme
(Arias et al., 2011). Pagiola et al. (2005) note that the
financial sustainability of a PES scheme ensures the sta-
bility of income for environmental service providers. In
some contexts, government financed PES may be the
only option.
2.2 Research methodology
To understand the organisational strengths and weak-
nesses of SFEs, and how these correspond with their
potential roles as environmental service providers, we
look at how various actors, including key government
agencies at different administrative levels, NGOs, inter-
national donor representatives, and farming households
participating in the program, perceive and view the role
of SFEs. Complementing this key stakeholders analy-
sis, we also examined: (1) the policy and legal frame-
work of SFEs in Vietnam; (2) pilot studies of PFES im-
plementation in Lam Dong and Son La provinces; and
(3) Tu Ly SFE’s involvement in PFES pilot programmes
in Hoa Binh province in northern Vietnam. We further
examined the operational procedures of the Tu Ly SFE
and its access to resources with a SWOT analysis. We
reviewed the policy and legal frameworks of SFEs in Vi-
etnam to determine if the new organisational and institu-
tional frameworks are conducive for SFEs to participate
in and mediate PFES projects. The pilot PFES in Lam
Dong and Son La provided a basis for discussion. The
PFES scheme in Lam Dong was implemented through
SFEs, while the pilot study in Son La involved com-
munities and households (Tan, 2011; Phuc et al., 2012;
Thuy et al., 2013; Bac et al., 2014).
Our empirical data are based on (i) interviews with
Tu Ly SFE employees (n= 4), (ii) interviews with civil
servants from implementing agencies at various institu-
tional levels (n= 16), (iii) a survey of households par-
ticipating in the SFE loan programme (n= 14), and
(iv) the outcomes of two stakeholder workshops held
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh in 2014. We also inter-
viewed key stakeholders at the provincial and district
levels (n= 14) to find out more about the implementa-
tion process and the stakeholders’ roles in implement-
ing the program. We used semi-structured questions
in our quantitative household survey, with which we
gathered information on the costs and benefits of joining
the Tu Ly SFE loan programme. We also interviewed
individuals paid by the enterprise to plant and manage
forest parcels.
3 Results
3.1 Tu Ly SFE in Da Bac district, Vietnam
Tu Ly SFE was established in 1978 with operations
on 4,612 hectares of sloping lands. Like all SFEs in
Vietnam, Tu Ly SFE began as a provincial government
programme. Its operations included the management
of a private Acacia plantation forest and management
of government projects, such as Program 661 in 1998.
Tu Ly SFE offered two types of contracts under the gov-
ernment projects to the households in the area. Type 1
contracts were agreements for planting, tending and pro-
tection of new forest. In return, the households had ac-
cess to the government subsidy (i.e., cash), firewood for
consumption, NTFPs (e.g., herbs, bamboo shoots), and
adult timber products (e.g., bamboo, Acacia). Type 2
contracts were for planting, tending and protection of
production forest in the SFE own forest. After 7 years,
households were allowed to harvest and sell adult tim-
ber. Via Type 2 contracts households managed 10 % of
the SFE own forest. Tu Ly SFE provided non-collateral
loans to households under the said contract, with annual
interest rates, ranging from 5.4 % to 8 % in 2000.
After the restructuring of SFEs in 2004 (Decree No.
200/2004/ND-CP), Tu Ly SFE found itself operating as
a subsidiary of Hoa Binh Forestry One Member Limited
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(iii) Type 2 contracts
plus wage labour
contracts (n=3)
1. Average size of household People 5 4 3
2. Average literacy rate % 88.0 86.0 83.0
3. Agriculture as primary source of income of household head Household 6 3 2
4. Farming as source of income Household 6 1 1
5. Livestock as source of income Household 3 1 1
6. Bamboo and NTFP collection as source of income Household 1 3 1
7. Non-agriculture wage or business as source of income Household 2 3 0
8. Recipients of government aid Household 3 1 2
9. Access to livelihood trainings Household 1 1 2
10. Owns red book for forest land Household 3 0 0
11. Average contracted forest area ha – 2.06 1.77
12. Average loan taken with SFE 1,000 VND – 9,000 23,000
13. Man-days per year hired man-day 32.5 – 83.3
14. Income from SFE employment % 26.0 – 40.0
15. Economic situation improved from SFE employment % 66.7 – 66.7
16. Received training from SFE % 16.7 60.0 33.3
Note: 1 USD= 20,800 VND; Source: Own data
Company, and at the same time as a district PFMB pro-
tecting 1,000 ha of forest for the government. As district
PFMB, they continued to receive payment from the gov-
ernment for planting and protecting the forest through
Type 1 contracts with farmers in the area. As a commer-
cial enterprise, Tu Ly SFE also managed 1,000 hectares
of production forest. The 90 % of this land was man-
aged directly by the enterprise, with hired local farmers
to plant and maintain the SFE forest. For the remain-
ing 10 %, Tu Ly SFE continued offering Type 2 con-
tracts and provided non-collateral loans to the house-
holds for the purchase of forest plantation inputs. The
households can apply for a maximum of US$ 500 per
hectare, per year, with end-of-term payment after seven
years, when farmers are allowed to harvest the planta-
tion forest. Between 2000 and 2010, Tu Ly SFE had
Type 2 contracts with 73 households to manage 314 hec-
tares of SFE’s forest.
To date, they only have 15 Type 2 contracts with
households in Da Bac. Since 2011, the contracts in-
cluded loan interest rates as high as 16 %, twice the
value of the loans they offered in 2000 under the govern-
ment projects. One of the changes and challenges in the
implementation of Decree No. 200/2004/ND-CP is the
reduced availability of SFE funds and loans (EASRD,
2005). Tu Ly SFE was able to continue operating de-
pendent on the Hoa Binh Forestry One Member Limited
Company, which funded their operations through loans
from the Bank for Investment Development of Vietnam
(at 8.4 % interest), the Vietnam Forest Corporation (at
9.6 % interest), and from their own revenues. The main
concerns of the enterprise are the high interest rates and
the more stringent lending criteria recently imposed by
the banks, making access to financing difficult. The bur-
den of high interest rates has been passed on to the con-
tracts with the farmers, making it difficult for the SFE
to recruit more farmers to agree to the conditions of the
Type 2 contracts.
3.2 Households participating in forest management in
Da Bac
We explored the perspectives and experiences of
farmers participating in forest management through the
Tu Ly SFE to shed light on the impact of PES. We sum-
marised the household characteristics and forest activ-
ities of groups representing three models of SFE in-
volvement with local residents: (i) households hired by
Tu Ly SFE to establish and manage the forest (i.e., wage
labour contracts), (ii) households under Type 2 contracts
with Tu Ly SFE to plant forests (i.e., forest plantation
contracts), and (iii) households having both Type 2 con-
tract and wage labour (Table 1). In 2013, Tu Ly SFE
hired 321 people on wage labour contracts (i) for 14,200
person-days for land preparation, digging holes, plant-
ing, and tending new forest plantations. Farmers were
paid, on average, US$ 6 per day.
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Fig. 2: Money flow from the province to households and communities managing forest in Da Bac district,
Hoa Binh province.
Majority of the respondents rely on agriculture for
their source of income. Most households with Type 2
contracts (ii) also rely on NFTPs for income. For those
with Type 2 contracts (ii and iii), average contracted
forestland is 2 ha. Those with combination of Type 2
contracts and wage labour (iii) have bigger loans with
Ty Ly SFE. 67 % of households interviewed revealed
that employment from Tu Ly SFE improved their eco-
nomic situation (Table 1). Those hired (i and iii) also
reported an increase in their income.
All of the respondents gained knowledge in forest
plantation and protection during their employment. Al-
though Tu Ly SFE does not provide formal training to
their contract farmers, they provide technical guidance
as needed. According to Dunn (2011), exposure to these
kinds of activities can develop long-term behavioural
change among households and individuals toward en-
vironmental issues such as slash and burn, illegal log-
ging and land degradation. In a PES experiment in Thua
Thien Hue province in Central Vietnam in 2003 (Bui &
Hong, 2006), training and interaction with technical ex-
perts enhanced the environmental awareness of particip-
ating households.
3.3 Management structure and money flow of forest
programme in Da Bac
The Vietnam Forest Protection and Development
Fund (VNFF) was established in 2008 (Decision No.
114/2008/QD-BNN) to enable the forest sector to meet
the demand for environmental services and to in-
crease revenues through PFES. The Fund supports the
PFES programme in Vietnam and is expected to raise
US$ 2 billion by 2020 (FAO, 2009). According to the
VNFF agency, hydropower contributes 98 % of total
PFES payments.
The main threats to the PFES programme in Vietnam
are the high transaction costs, at provincial- and district-
levels, which reduce the net funds available for house-
holds and communities with Type 1 and Type 2 contracts
to manage the forest, as revealed in the implementation
of Program 661 and the money flow of the programme
funds. Figure 2 shows the flow of funds received by
farmers who adopt management schemes designed to
protect the forest in Da Bac district. Funds of Pro-
gram 661 were channelled through its provincial offices
to three district management boards and community
levels. The authorities involved in the implementation
and monitoring that constitute the web of commands in-
clude: the Agroforestry Planning Department, Forestry
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Table 2: A comparison of some variables affecting transaction cost of managing Program
661 by Tu Ly SFE and the Protection Forest Management Board.
Independent variables affecting transaction costs Tu Ly SFE
Management
Board of Da river
Protection Forest
Number of communes served 9 11
Start-up variables
Staff involved in implementation planning 4 10
Staff involved in programme dissemination 3 2
Implementation variables
Staff involved in monthly and annual meetings 7 10
Aggregated man-day spent on meetings 501 618
Staff involved in contract signing and disbursement 1 4
Staff involved in monitoring and enforcement 1 4
Source: Own data, key informant interviews in 2012.
Department, Forest Protection Department, Department
of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of
Natural Resources and Environment, and the People’s
Committee at different levels. Since the Management
Board of Da River Protection Forest implemented the
program across all districts in the Da River Reservoir
catchment area, funds came directly from the provincial
treasury, while Management Board of Nature Conserva-
tion Areas and Management Board of Protection Forest
received funds from the district treasury. All three man-
agement boards were responsible for transferring gov-
ernment subsidies to households and communities as
payment for their forest management activities. Funds
were also used to hire technical experts and pay seed-
ling suppliers. Needless to say, administrative and trans-
action costs escalate when more parties are involved.
Reducing administrative and organisational costs, stem-
ming from the heterogeneity and quantity of public au-
thorities, will reduce the costs and enhance the financial
sustainability of the PFES programme.
Funds provided to households under Tu Ly SFE con-
tracts follow a different channel (shown in Fig. 2). For
government programmes, Tu Ly SFE received funds dir-
ectly from the District Treasury. For enterprise con-
tracts, the funds are discharged via Hoa Binh Forestry
One Member Limited Company to Tu Ly SFE, and then
to the households. No other authorities receive funds
from the company. With fewer actors, and experienced
staff, Tu Ly SFE’s administrative and operating costs
are perceived to be less as revealed in the interviews
with key stakeholders. According to Vatn (2010), expe-
rience (i.e., running systems over years) is expected to
reduce transaction costs. A comparison of Tu Ly SFE’s
transactions with those of the Management Board of Da
River Protection Forest in the district under Program
661 funds revealed that Tu Ly SFE used less staff in
starting up and implementing the programme (Table 2).
Because Tu Ly SFE has a global presence in the district,
they disseminate information about forest programmes,
monitor forest activities, and conduct other activities
more easily. Provincial and district authorities in Hoa
Binh acknowledged that SFEs can manage the forest
better, and therefore should continue their role in the
forest sector. Also, Tu Ly SFE propagates seedlings in
their nursery, thereby avoiding the cost of out-sourcing.
At present, the transaction and operation costs of
many implementing authorities at all levels substantially
reduce the net funds available for households and com-
munities protecting the forest in Vietnam. For instance,
Thuy et al. (2013) reported that the PFES programme in
Son La Province spends most of the 10 % of its revenue
from the PFES (decree states that only 10 % of the total
revenue from the PFES buyers will be retained for op-
erating costs, including administrative and transaction
costs) on checking forest protection performance and
disbursing funds to 3,500 households. The programme
requires more funding to reach out to all 64,000 forest
owners. The costs of monitoring compliance with PFES
agreements are also high (Phuc et al., 2012; VNFF,
2013).
4 Discussion
Despite heavy criticism of SFEs, including having
paid too little attention to their responsibility for pro-
tecting forests (Dang, 2001) and the inability of some to
be financially sustainable (EASRD, 2005), the govern-
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ment of Vietnam recognised the important role played
by these enterprises. Although the practices of SFEs
did not fulfil all forest ecosytem services, especially
on biodiversity and off-setting pressure on primary or
old growth forest, the plantation forests they managed
played a vital role in the provision of environmental ser-
vices, such as watershed protection (Bui & Hong, 2006),
when compared to agriculture and other forms of land
use. Other environmental services provided by planta-
tion forest such as reduction of soil erosion (hence re-
duction of sediment silted in rivers and reservoirs, regu-
lation of water resources that provides longer inflow, re-
habilitation of degraded land, and carbon sequestration),
should be given importance. Thus, continued efforts
should be made to reform the organisation and manage-
ment of these SFEs.
4.1 Criteria for Successful PES Programme
To encourage SFEs in Vietnam to participate in the
government’s PFES programme as service providers,
acceptable regulations, payments and incentives must
be carefully considered. Innovative incentives may at-
tract SFEs to adopt sustainable forestry practices. By
recruiting SFEs as monitoring agencies of forest activ-
ities outside their administrative areas, SFEs will create
additional sources of income to boost their financial vi-
ability.
4.1.1 Impact and Acceptability of PFES
While considering SFEs as both participants in and
agents of the PFES programme in Vietnam, their role in
engaging poor families in their areas needs to be con-
sidered. Outreach to poor households must take pre-
cedence over any special consideration given to those
individuals with special connections to SFEs. It is pos-
sible that Tu Ly SFE favours some households in the
area. Those with Type 2 contracts are hired more often
and received bigger loans. Similar issues were raised
in the Lam Dong PES pilot study. The impact of PFES
on rural poverty alleviation in the pilot study came un-
der scrutiny when households without pre-existing con-
tracts with the SFEs were excluded (Phuc et al., 2012).
In their defence, Tu Ly SFE justifies hiring households
with contracts to help those households recover the high
cost of the loans. The 16 % interest rate has discour-
aged many farmers in the area from participating in the
Tu Ly SFE programme. For the period 2013 to 2014,
the enterprise has entered into contracts with only three
new households.
Most of the households were open-minded about the
potential of forest management as an alternative liveli-
hood, but expressed the need for more land for forest
production and better contract terms. In the pilot study
in Son La, the small landholdings (on average 2 ha) was
one of the reasons households did not gain any signifi-
cant benefit from PES payments (Phuc et al., 2012).
Households also stated they would be more active in
Tu Ly SFE contracts, if they were given interest-free
loans. In addition, the current contracts emphasise con-
servation and protection, which for some, is a disincent-
ive to participate, as there are too few livelihood op-
portunities with immediate gains. Although the con-
tracts clearly state the responsibilities and benefits of
the SFE and the contract farmer, there is no clear state-
ment regarding the use of NFTPs such as honey, herbs,
fruits, firewood, and bamboo. Also, tree species se-
lection is highly centralised, with defined management
rules, making the terms inflexible. There is consensus
that contracts should have attractive terms and condi-
tions, such as reduced or zero interest rates on loans,
and provisions for increasing revenue through access to
NTFPs.
4.1.2 Cost and financial sustainability
In Vietnam, hydropower companies allocate a por-
tion of their income to an environmental fund as per
government directives. Whereas many private PES
agreements fail over time, due to inadequate or insec-
ure funding (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Todorova
et al., 2013), the Vietnam directives ensure continued
sources of funding for PFES in hydropower watershed
areas. The PFES value has been pre-determined by the
government. Hydropower operators pay 20 Vietnam
dong (VND)/kwh (USD 0.001/kwh) while water sup-
ply companies pay 40 VND/m3 (USD 0.002/m3) and
tourist organisations pay 1–2 % of their annual income.
Because the programme is a legal instrument, the ser-
vice users must accept the pre-determined level of pay-
ment. The government is currently revising its PFES
valuation (Litzenberg, 2013). Lower transaction cost of
the programme can result to acceptable payment rates.
4.2 Moving forward with SFEs
Table 3 presents a strengths, weaknesses, opportun-
ities, and threats (SWOT) analysis of SFE as environ-
mental service providers and using them as intermediar-
ies for monitoring activities in a PFES programme.
As revealed in the SWOT study, implementation of
PFES was faster and more effective partly because
forests were managed by SFEs. Stakeholders of the
PFES pilot studies in Vietnam shared similar observa-
tion. The PFES pilot study in Lam Dong province began
working with SFEs in 2008. Local households with ex-
isting contracts (under Program 327 and Program 661)
F. Milan et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 118 - 2 (2017) 269–281 277
Table 3: SWOT analysis of SFEs as environmental service providers and as intermediaries for monitoring activities in the PFES
programme.
Strengths Weaknesses
• Institutional framework based on business principles to be
financially viable, but remain as agencies for forest protec-
tion under government regulations
• Implementation of new guidelines are easily disseminated
and enforced
• Lower transaction cost due to:
– Fewer parties involved in managing and monitoring
their forestry programmes
– Many years of specialised experience in forest manage-
ment
– Greater autonomy and outreach in the district
• Advantage of expertise
• Experience in monitoring
• Pressure to become financially independent drive SFEs to
be more profitable, with less regard for forest protection.
• Selectiveness of SFE contracts and employment, capturing
local elites with connections to political power (Sikor and
Tan, 2007; Phuc et al., 2012) so they are not that autonome
as mentioned as strength
• Capital shortages and inadequate financing, due to high in-
terest rates and stringent lending criteria imposed by banks
Opportunities Threats
• Can create opportunities for local-level negotiations and
choices regarding forest management contracts that ac-
commodate local needs and livelihoods
• Possibility of contracting SFE for monitoring forest activ-
ities other than their own land
• The institutional arrangements of PFES in Vietnam
already consider SFEs as an environmental service pro-
vider
• Opportunity to secure funds for the sustainability of the
company
• Revenue from PFES is an interest-free capital for SFEs
• Recurrence of the damaging SFE-era before the reform in
1991.
• No clear directive from the government as to how the
provinces distribute the funds.
1 Source: Own depiction
were given PFES contracts. To date, 3,400 households
have received payments for their services from SFEs.
The successful model in Lam Dong can be attributed
partly to working with the 13 state organisations (SFEs
and PFMBs) that own and manage most of the forest
land in the area. In contrast with Lam Dong, the Son La
pilot study is directly involved with local households.
Forest area had already been allocated to 50,000 forest
owners in the early 2000s (Phuc et al., 2012). The dis-
tribution of PFES had been slow and faced high transac-
tion costs. The SFEs and PFMBs in Lam Dong prepared
the necessary documents to support the contracts with
households. In return, the SFEs and PFMBs were paid
to administer the contracts. Winrock International and
the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
have stated that monitoring of forest cover and quality is
costly for the government (Thuy et al., 2013; Nga, 2014)
and local government agencies do not have the capacity
and experience to monitor the PFES programme. Trans-
action costs tend to be high because of the large number
of forest owners, the complexity of administrative struc-
tures, the limited capacity of public servants, conflicts of
interest and week coordination and information sharing
between and within government agencies.
The social and economic benefits of Vietnam’s SFEs
are largely ignored. Efforts are needed to reinvigorate
and maximize potential of SFEs, and to realize a struc-
ture which includes SFEs’ role in reducing transaction
cost in PES programmes to rebuild Vietnam’s forest.
To improve the financial sustainability of SFEs, in-
novative partnerships with communities, rather than
with many individuals, can reduce transaction costs
(Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Blore et al., 2013). There
are success stories of communal forest management in
Vietnam, especially where the social composition is
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heterogeneous (Sikor & Tan, 2011). It is important
to increase local participation in SFE programmes to
improve their financial sustainability and increase the
benefits provided to local residents. This can be done
through attractive terms and conditions of SFE con-
tracts. With the potential of PFES as an interest-free
capital source, SFEs can reduce interest rates on loans.
The key to attracting poor farmers to participate is the
identification of profitable activities. SFEs could work
with households to develop alternative forms of agro-
forestry for adoption in forested areas. Mono-culture
needs to be reduced to avoid periods without revenue.
Allowing mixed forest plantations in the PFES pro-
gramme, planting fruit trees with forest trees, and rais-
ing animals under forest canopies are examples of in-
centives for poor farmers to participate in forest man-
agement. The government could also encourage partici-
pation by studying the feasibility of in-kind payments
in PES, such as the provision of materials, training and
expertise.
With the devolution of the forest sector in Vietnam
and the move towards a market-oriented economy, SFEs
are facing financial constraints from the shortage of cap-
ital (MARD, 2012). The high interest rates imposed by
banks on SFEs have reduced the activities of SFEs and
limited the outreach of their forest programmes, which
led to the dissolution of some enterprises. There is a
need to resolve the difficulties faced by SFEs regarding
access to funds and unacceptable contracts. With the
proposed role of SFEs as intermediaries in PFES pro-
gramme activities, payments for the services (e.g., wa-
tershed protection) could lift some of the financial bur-
den.
Using SFEs as intermediaries for the PFES pro-
gramme in Vietnam is not a novel idea. SFEs have car-
ried out these responsibilities in past government pro-
grammes. The recruitment of SFEs to monitor forest
activities outside their forest lands is logical, given their
expertise and experience in collaboration with local
farmers. The system has been piloted with positive out-
comes, but regulations must be revisited to provide con-
crete guidelines. The government must issue implemen-
tation guidelines to ensure wider outreach of the pro-
gramme to improve livelihoods. SFEs can achieve im-
pacts by working with many poor households in fores-
ted areas. In 2007, more than 20,000 farmers were em-
ployed by SFEs to maintain seedling nurseries, plant and
prune trees, and maintain forest firewalls (FAO, 2009).
The current discourse on transaction costs should
consider the roles of institutional reform and organisa-
tional change in ensuring programme success. An ef-
fective regulatory and monitoring framework is essen-
tial to avoid repeating historical problems with SFEs.
To achieve wider distributed impact, regulations regard-
ing the acceptable terms and conditions of SFE contracts
are needed to encourage local participation. Consider-
ing additional livelihood options (e.g., product devel-
opment of NTFPs, bee keeping, nursery raising) in the
policies is important for poor farmers, due to the long
recovery period of capital and gains. In doing so, forest
protection and livelihood support can be addressed to-
gether. Although the study analysed only one SFE and a
modest number of its contractors or employees, results
are consistent with previous pilot studies in Vietnam. It
showed the strengths and weaknesses of using SFEs as
environmental service providers and intermediaries for
monitoring activities in the PFES programme.
Acknowledgements:
The authors would like to thank the project “Opportunit-
ies for economic incentives to promote sustainable land
and water management in the sloping lands of South and
Southeast Asia” funded by the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, Germany for sup-
port to the study presented in this paper.
References
Adhikari, B. & Lovett, J. C. (2006). Transaction costs
and community-based natural resource management
in Nepal. Journal of Environmental Management,
78 (1), 5–15.
Arias, M. E., Cochrane, T. A., Lawrence, K. S., Killeen,
T. J. & Farrell, T. A. (2011). Paying the forest for
electricity: A modelling framework to market forest
conservation as payment for ecosystem services be-
nefiting hydropower generation. Environmental Con-
servation, 38 (4), 473–484.
Artemiev, I. (2003). State forestry enterprise reform
in Vietnam: Unlocking the potential for commercial
wood growing. Technical Note May 2003. World
Bank, Washington D.C., USA.
Bac, D. V., Catacutan, D. C. & Ha, H. M. (2014). Im-
portance of national policy and local interpretation in
designing payment for forest environmental services
scheme for the Ta Leng river basin in Northeast Viet-
nam. Environment and Natural Resources Research,
4 (1), 39–53.
F. Milan et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 118 - 2 (2017) 269–281 279
Blore, M. L., Cundill, G. & Mkhulisi, M. (2013).
Towards measuring the transaction costs of co-
management in Mkambati Nature Reserve, Eastern
Cape, South Africa. Journal of Environmental Man-
agement, 129, 444–455.
Bui, D. T. & Hong, B. N. (2006). Payments for environ-
mental services in Vietnam: Assessing an economic
approach to sustainable forest management. EEP-
SEA, Singapore.
Bulte, E. H., Lipper, L., Stringer, R. & Zilberman,
D. (2008). Payments for ecosystem services and
poverty reduction: Concepts, issues, and empirical
perspectives. Environment and Development Eco-
nomics, 13 (3), 245–254.
CIFOR (2013). Rewarding the upland poor for envir-
onmental services: An innovative strategy to reward
Asia’s upland poor for preserving and improving our
environment. World Agroforestry Center, Bogor, In-
donesia.
Clements, T., John, A., Nielsen, K., An, D., Tan, S.
& Milner-Gulland, E. (2010). Payments for biod-
iversity conservation in the context of weak institu-
tions: Comparison of three programs from Cambodia.
Ecological Economics, 69 (6), 1283–1291.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost.
Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.
Dang, N. V. (2001). Lâm nghiê. p Viê. t Nam 1945–1950
(Vietnam forestry 1945–1950). Ha Noi Agriculture
Publishing House, Ha Noi, Vietnam.
Dunn, H. (2011). Payments for ecosystem services. Evi-
dence and analysis series. Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs, London.
EASRD (2005). State forest enterprise reform in Viet-
nam. Technical Note. World Bank, Washington D.C.,
USA.
Ecosystem Marketplace (2008). Payments for ecosystem
services: Market profiles. Forest Trends and Ecosys-
tem Marketplace, Washington, DC, USA.
Falconer, K. (2000). Farm-level constraints on agri-
environmental scheme participation: A transactional
perspective. Journal of Rural Studies, 16 (3), 379–
394.
FAO (2001). Global forest resources assessment 2000:
Main report. FAO Forestry Paper No. 140, Rome,
Italy.
FAO (2007). The state of food and agriculture: Paying
farmers for environmental services. FAO Agricultural
Series No. 38, Rome, Italy.
FAO (2009). Vietnam forestry outlook study. Working
paper No. APFSOS II/WP/2009/09. FAO, Bangkok,
Thailand.
Fuhrer, E. (2000). Forest functions, ecosystem stability
and management. Forest Ecology and Management,
132, 29–38.
Gauvin, C., Uchida, E., Rozelle, S., Xu, J. & Zhan, J.
(2010). Cost-effectiveness of payments for ecosystem
services with dual goals of environment and poverty
alleviation. Environmental Management, 45 (3), 488–
501.
Government of Vietnam (1998). Decision No. 661/QD-
TTg dated July 29, 1998 of the Prime Minister on ob-
jectives, tasks, policies and implementation arrange-
ments for the Five Million Hectare Reforestation Pro-
gram. Ha Noi, Vietnam.
Government of Vietnam (2010). Decree No.
99/2010/ND-CP dated September 24, 2010 of the
Government on policy for payments for forest envir-
onmental services. Ha Noi, Vietnam.
de Groot, R. S. & van der Meer, P. J. (2010). Quan-
tifying and valuing goods and services provided by
plantation forests. In: Bauhus, J., van der Meer, P. &
Kanninen, M. (eds.), Ecosystem goods and services
from plantation forests. pp. 16–42, Earthscan, Lon-
don.
de Jong, W., Sam, D. D. & Hung, T. V. (2006). Forest
rehabilitation in Vietnam: Histories, realities and
future. Center for International Forestry Research,
Bogor, Indonesia.
Kile, G., Booth, T., Cromer, R., Marcar, N., Myers,
B. & Polglase, P. (1998). The role of plantations
and farm forests in sustainable land management. In:
Boosting International Competitiveness in the Aus-
tralian Timber and Forestry Industry, Australian Tim-
ber and Forestry Conference, Proceedings, 29–30
April, 1998, Sydney. National Association of Forest
Industries, Canberra.
Kronenberg, J. & Hubacek, K. (2013). Could payments
for ecosystem services create an “ecosystem service
curse”. Ecology and Society, 18 (1), 10.
Lamb, D., Erskine, P. D. & Parrotta, J. A. (2005). Res-
toration of degraded tropical forest landscapes. Sci-
ence, 310 (5754), 1628–1632.
280 F. Milan et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 118 - 2 (2017) 269–281
Landell-Mills, N. & Porras, I. T. (2002). Silver bullet
or fools’ gold?: A global review of markets for forest
environmental services and their impact on the poor.
International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment, London, UK.
Liss, B.-M. (2008). Development and application of
a pilot policy on payment for environmental services
(PES) in Da river basin, Son La province. Consult-
ant report to the Vietnamese-German forestry pro-
gramme, International consultancy services, Lands-
berg/Lech, Germany.
Litzenberg, I. (2013). Vietnam forest protection and
development fund. Paper presented at the regional
workshop on ‘Challenges in benefit sharing and
livelihood improvement with water storage develop-
ment’, March 20–21, 2014, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
MARD (2012). Forest sector development report 2011:
Serving FSSP annual plenary meeting, 1 March
2012. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment (MARD), Ha Noi, Vietnam.
Mayrand, K. & Paquin, M. (2004). Payments for
environmental services: A survey and assessment
of current schemes. Unisfera International Centre,
Montreal, Canada. 52 p.
McElwee, P. (2009). Reforesting “bare hills” in Viet-
nam: Social and environmental consequences of the
5 million hectare reforestation program. Ambio: A
Journal of the Human Environment, 38 (6), 325–333.
Mettepenningen, E., Verspecht, A. & van Huylen-
broeck, G. (2009). Measuring private transac-
tion costs of European agri-environmental schemes.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Manage-
ment, 52 (5), 649–667.
Milder, J. C., Scherr, S. J. & Bracer, C. (2010). Trends
and future potential of payment for ecosystem ser-
vices to alleviate rural poverty in developing coun-
tries. Ecology and Society, 15 (2), 4.
Nambiar, E. S. (1999). Productivity and sustainability
of plantation forests. Bosque, 20 (1), 9–21.
Nga, D. T. (2014). Payments for forest environmental
services: Practice and challenges in Quang Nam,
Nghe An, and Thanh Hoa. Paper presented dur-
ing the Stakeholder workshop on benefit sharing and
payments for environmental services, 10–11, March
2014. Ha Noi, Vietnam.
Nguyen, T. T., Bauer, S. & Uibrig, H. (2010). Land
privatization and afforestation incentive of rural farms
in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. Forest Policy
and Economics, 12 (7), 518–526.
Nguyen, T. T., Koellner, T., Le, Q. B., Lambini, C. K.,
Choi, I. & Shin, H.-J. (2014). An economic analysis
of reforestation with a native tree species: The case of
Vietnamese farmers. Biodiversity and Conservation,
23 (4), 811–830.
Nguyen, T. T., Pham, V. D. & Tenhunen, J. (2013).
Linking regional land use and payments for forest hy-
drological services: A case study of Hoa Binh Reser-
voir in Vietnam. Land Use Policy, 33, 130–140.
Pagiola, S., Arcenas, A. & Platais, G. (2005). Can
payments for environmental services help reduce
poverty? An exploration of the issues and the evi-
dence to date from Latin America. World Develop-
ment, 33 (2), 237–253.
Phuc, T. X., Dressler, W. H., Mahanty, S., Thuy, P. T.
& Zingerli, C. (2012). The prospects for payment for
ecosystem services (PES) in Vietnam: A look at three
payment schemes. Human Ecology, 40 (2), 237–249.
Qi, S. (2014). Research on the legal system of payment
for ecosystem services under the global perspective.
Canadian Social Science, 10 (2), 108–112.
Šálek, L. & Sloup, R. (2012). Economic evaluation of
proposed pure and mixed stands in Central Vietnam
highlands. Journal of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment in the Tropics and Subtropics, 113 (1), 21–29.
Šálek, L. & Výlupek, O. (2012). Contribution to the res-
toration of mixed forests in Central Vietnam. Journal
of Sustainable Forestry, 31 (6), 549–562.
Scherr, S. J. & Bennett, M. T. (2011). Buyer, regu-
lator, and enabler – The government’s role in ecosys-
tem services markets: International lessons learned
for payments for ecological services in the People’s
Republic of China. Asian Development Bank, Man-
daluyong City, Philippines.
Scherr, S. J., Bennett, M. T., Loughney, M. & Canby,
K. (2006). Developing future ecosystem service pay-
ments in China: Lessons learned from international
experience. Forest Trends, Washington, D.C., USA.
Shelton, D., Cork, S., Banning, C., Parry, R., Hairsine,
P., Verteyy, R. & Stauffacher, M. (2001). Application
of an ecosystem services inventory approach to the
Goulburn broken catchment. In: Rutherford, I., SHel-
don, F., Brierly, G. & Kenyon, C. (eds.), Proocedings
of the Third Australian Stream Management Confer-
ence August 27–29, 2001. pp. 157–162, Cooperative
Research Centre for Catchment Hydrology, Brisbane.
F. Milan et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 118 - 2 (2017) 269–281 281
Sikor, T. (1998). Forest policy reform: From state to
household forestry. In: Stewards of Vietnam’s upland
forests. pp. 18–38, Asia Forest Network, Berkeley.
Sikor, T. & Tan, N. Q. (2007). Why may forest devol-
ution not benefit the rural poor? Forest entitlements
in Vietnam’s central highlands. World Development,
35 (11), 2010–2025.
Sikor, T. & Tan, N. Q. (2011). Realizing forest rights
in Vietnam: Addressing issues in community forest
management. The Center for People and Forests (RE-
COFTC), Bangkok, Thailand.
Sommerville, M. M., Milner-Gulland, E. & Jones, J. P.
(2011). The challenge of monitoring biodiversity
in payment for environmental service interventions.
Biological Conservation, 144 (12), 2832–2841.
Tallis, H., Kareiva, P., Marvier, M. & Chang, A. (2008).
An ecosystem services framework to support both
practical conservation and economic development.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
105, 9457–9464.
Tan, N. Q. (2011). Payment for environmental services
in Vietnam: An analysis of the pilot project in Lam
Dong province. Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies (IGES), Hayama, Japan.
Tan, N. Q., Ngai, N. B., Thanh, T. N., Sunderlin, W. &
Yasmi, Y. (2008). Forest tenure reform in Vietnam:
Case studies from the Northern Upland and Central
Highlands regions. The Center for People and Forests
(RECOFTC), Bangkok, Thailand and The Rights and
Resources Initiative (RRI), Washington D.C., USA. ,
unpublished Draft Report.
Thuy, P. T., Bennett, K., Phuong, V. T., Brunner, J.,
Dung, L. N. & Tien, N. D. (2013). Payments for forest
environmental services in Vietnam: From policy to
practice. Occasional Paper 93. Center for Inter-
national Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
Todorova, M., Martini, M., Lucius, I., Grigorova, Y.
& Tresierra, J. (2013). Promoting payments for
ecosystem services and related sustainable financing
schemes in the Danube Basin. WWF, Switzerland.
Vatn, A. (2010). An institutional analysis of payments
for environmental services. Ecological Economics,
69, 1245–1252.
VNFF (2013). Proceedings workshop on payment for
forest environmental services in Vietnam – Status and
solutions. Vietnam National Forest Protection and
Development Fund (VNFF), Ha Noi, Vietnam.
Wunder, S. (2008). Payments for environmental ser-
vices and the poor: Concepts and preliminary evi-
dence. Environment and Development Economics,
13 (3), 279–297.
Zhu, X., Møller, L. R., De Lopez, T. T. & Za-
balla Romero, M. E. (2010). Pathways for implement-
ing REDD+: Experiences from carbon markets and
communities. Danmarks Tekniske Universitet, Risø
Nationallaboratoriet for Bæredygtig Energi.
Zilberman, D., Lipper, L. & McCarthy, N. (2008). When
could payments for environmental services benefit the
poor? Environment and Development Economics,
13 (3), 255–278.
